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Sense Hofstede's avatar

Some more background:

In letters to the Lower House of the Dutch parliament, trade minister Sjoerdsma said the government of the Netherlands opposes the extraterritoriality of the MATCH Act, since it believes countries should be responsible for their own export controls. Apparently, Dutch diplomats and visitors have been pushing this message in DC recently, including to Congress:

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3353452/netherlands-protests-us-proposal-further-bar-chip-giant-asml-china-market

Dutch letters:

https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/kamervragen/detail?id=2026Z07615&did=2026D21750

https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/kamervragen/detail?id=2026Z10558&did=2026D29627

Todd Royer's avatar

I think this arguement is less about chips than it is about technological ecosystems.

Machines can be purchased. Designs can be copied. Parts can often be reverse engineered. But some forms of knowledge are much harder to duplicate. Maintenance expertise, supplier relationships, process knowledge, engineering talent, and institutional experience accumulate over decades.

That is what makes the servicing question so fascinating. The debate is not simply whether China can buy advanced equipment. It is whether access to the broader ecosystem surrounding that equipment can be restricted long enough to preserve a technological lead.

At the same time, history suggests that challengers eventually develop many of these capabilities themselves. The question is not whether that happens, but how long it takes and what strategic advantages the delay creates for the incumbent.

For me, that is what makes this such an interesting industrial policy story. It sits at the intersection of technology, manufacturing, institutions, and geopolitics.

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