If the goal of China and the U.S. is for each to have its sphere of influence, what constitutes China's sphere of influence if, for instance, Malaysia and Cambodia sign trade agreements which put them in the sphere of influence of the U.S.?
It's interesting that there seems to be a bipartisan consensus towards treating allies with hegemonic contempt, telling them a clear "or else". From a European (or Japanese) perspective it's hard not to conclude that the US is actually the worse threat than China, and maybe, in view of recent volatility in US policies, in the long term it might be better for those former US allies to get closer to China.
However, it celebrates leverage-based coercion over "failed" multilateral cajoling. Be careful what you wish for. By abandoning rules-based institutions for bilateral bullying, the US validates China's authoritarian model precisely as American relative power declines. When Trump slaps tariffs on Canada over TV ads whilst China offers predictable (if predatory) Belt and Road terms, risk-averse third countries learn that US policy runs on impulse whilst Chinese policy runs on interests - making Beijing the safer bet for long-term planning.
Arguably, the correct counterfactual isn't cajoling harder, but having defensive semiconductor decoupling with offensive coalition-building (TPP revival, WTO reform, BRI infrastructure alternative) - expensive, but cheaper than fragmenting into US/China blocs where the Chinese bloc has more people, manufacturing capacity, and resource access.
The US won't be hegemon forever - ask Britain about Fortress Empire. "Fortress North America" only works if others don't build Fortress China and satellites. Every emergency power abuse depletes the institutional capital needed to prevent exactly that. China doesn't need to out-compete America; it just needs to be less chaotic, and Trump's approach hands them that victory. China notoriously thinks long term and when the US is no longer the bully on the block, the rules it demolished won't protect it, either.
If the goal of China and the U.S. is for each to have its sphere of influence, what constitutes China's sphere of influence if, for instance, Malaysia and Cambodia sign trade agreements which put them in the sphere of influence of the U.S.?
It's interesting that there seems to be a bipartisan consensus towards treating allies with hegemonic contempt, telling them a clear "or else". From a European (or Japanese) perspective it's hard not to conclude that the US is actually the worse threat than China, and maybe, in view of recent volatility in US policies, in the long term it might be better for those former US allies to get closer to China.
Great pod, as ever.
However, it celebrates leverage-based coercion over "failed" multilateral cajoling. Be careful what you wish for. By abandoning rules-based institutions for bilateral bullying, the US validates China's authoritarian model precisely as American relative power declines. When Trump slaps tariffs on Canada over TV ads whilst China offers predictable (if predatory) Belt and Road terms, risk-averse third countries learn that US policy runs on impulse whilst Chinese policy runs on interests - making Beijing the safer bet for long-term planning.
Arguably, the correct counterfactual isn't cajoling harder, but having defensive semiconductor decoupling with offensive coalition-building (TPP revival, WTO reform, BRI infrastructure alternative) - expensive, but cheaper than fragmenting into US/China blocs where the Chinese bloc has more people, manufacturing capacity, and resource access.
The US won't be hegemon forever - ask Britain about Fortress Empire. "Fortress North America" only works if others don't build Fortress China and satellites. Every emergency power abuse depletes the institutional capital needed to prevent exactly that. China doesn't need to out-compete America; it just needs to be less chaotic, and Trump's approach hands them that victory. China notoriously thinks long term and when the US is no longer the bully on the block, the rules it demolished won't protect it, either.
Typical European whining, eh?