Surely, when you add up all the China collapse stories, the BRI debt traps and the China Threats stories, all the Xinjiang genocide stories, all the journalists, the clicks and advertising, that must equate to at least 1% of America’s GDP by now.
What makes this fascinating is how quickly “warlord” stops looking like a purely military category and starts looking like an economic one. Control the resource, control the trade route, collect the revenue — and suddenly the economics of the conflict become inseparable from the fighting itself.
The other problem is that Logan Wright doesn't see that tech and manufacturing feeds into services. So the reason that you can get delivery super-cheap is because of the tech infrastructure, and the more you put into tech investment, the more this will generate growth through expanding services. It's also very unlikely that the Chinese leadership will change its growth model since it seems to be working.
The problem is that here are no numbers here. No one believes that China can grow at 10+%. If you want that much growth, go to Vietnam or Africa. The goal is 4-5% growth for the next decade, and that looks pretty reasonable. I don't see any sign that the Chinese financial system is broken, and it looks a lot healthier than the US system.
The most interesting thread for me here is that economic power is not the same as productive capacity. An economy can keep building impressive industrial capabilities while the underlying system of capital allocation, domestic demand, quality of life and employment gradually loses its ability to sustain them. Perhaps the deeper lesson is that systems most likely dont break at the point where their strengths disappear, but when those strengths become disconnected from the foundations that created them.
Excellent discussion. I’d add one further cost of Xi’s insistence that technological leadership can overcome China’s structural economic problems: the distrust his policies leave behind. Companies may keep buying from Chinese factories while their governments work to reduce dependence on supply chains Beijing can weaponize.
That creates a harder inheritance for his successor. Even genuine reform could meet a less receptive United States and other trading partners already committed to finding alternatives. Your Brezhnev comparison raises this additional question: how much room for eventual reform does an inflexible leader destroy, both at home and abroad?
How much of a role can creating a national sustainable energy transition play? Vocational Training, jobs, less external fossil fuel purchases thus more funds for domestic goals. Could this be a large enough domestic stimulus plan to accompany the AI robotics emphasis?
What is stopping Chinese banks from simply lying (or “lying”) in tandem with state-sponsored vouching about the amount of USD on their books as a hedge against slow domestic growth, enforced through legitimacy laundering through Chinese courts?
So the China collapse stories continue.
Surely, when you add up all the China collapse stories, the BRI debt traps and the China Threats stories, all the Xinjiang genocide stories, all the journalists, the clicks and advertising, that must equate to at least 1% of America’s GDP by now.
What makes this fascinating is how quickly “warlord” stops looking like a purely military category and starts looking like an economic one. Control the resource, control the trade route, collect the revenue — and suddenly the economics of the conflict become inseparable from the fighting itself.
One of the best China episodes of the year and an excellent book
瞎扯。
The other problem is that Logan Wright doesn't see that tech and manufacturing feeds into services. So the reason that you can get delivery super-cheap is because of the tech infrastructure, and the more you put into tech investment, the more this will generate growth through expanding services. It's also very unlikely that the Chinese leadership will change its growth model since it seems to be working.
The problem is that here are no numbers here. No one believes that China can grow at 10+%. If you want that much growth, go to Vietnam or Africa. The goal is 4-5% growth for the next decade, and that looks pretty reasonable. I don't see any sign that the Chinese financial system is broken, and it looks a lot healthier than the US system.
The problem with this is that the idea that the Chinese economy is not growing just does not comport with what people are actually seeing.
The most interesting thread for me here is that economic power is not the same as productive capacity. An economy can keep building impressive industrial capabilities while the underlying system of capital allocation, domestic demand, quality of life and employment gradually loses its ability to sustain them. Perhaps the deeper lesson is that systems most likely dont break at the point where their strengths disappear, but when those strengths become disconnected from the foundations that created them.
Excellent discussion. I’d add one further cost of Xi’s insistence that technological leadership can overcome China’s structural economic problems: the distrust his policies leave behind. Companies may keep buying from Chinese factories while their governments work to reduce dependence on supply chains Beijing can weaponize.
That creates a harder inheritance for his successor. Even genuine reform could meet a less receptive United States and other trading partners already committed to finding alternatives. Your Brezhnev comparison raises this additional question: how much room for eventual reform does an inflexible leader destroy, both at home and abroad?
it's hard not to think that posting this on september 30 wasn't a deliberate choice LOL. nice one well done.
Cannot believe you didn't also invite Gordon Chang to the conversation!
Great episode, well done Jordan !
How much of a role can creating a national sustainable energy transition play? Vocational Training, jobs, less external fossil fuel purchases thus more funds for domestic goals. Could this be a large enough domestic stimulus plan to accompany the AI robotics emphasis?
What is stopping Chinese banks from simply lying (or “lying”) in tandem with state-sponsored vouching about the amount of USD on their books as a hedge against slow domestic growth, enforced through legitimacy laundering through Chinese courts?