Two announcements before we dive in:
Remember when Jordan’s wife ran a ‘looking for a CTO’ post for an insuretech startup? Well, thanks to the ChinaTalk network, she found an incredible one. They’re now revenue positive and halfway through a seed round. Thank you all for the help!
Jordan will be in DC the week after Thanksgiving for a hot minute and will be hosting a meetup on Dec 2nd.
This piece was authored by anonymous contributor “Matteo Clavijero”.
The blue wave of the midterms has put rare earth companies in the hot seat. Rare earths, particularly those used in the production of permanent magnets, are a critical input enabling trillions of dollars of downstream economic value. Beijing dominates the rare earth magnet supply chain from ore extraction to magnetization, with over 90% of mining, refining, and magnet-making concentrated in China. The CCP has repeatedly sought geopolitical leverage by exercising export restrictions on rare earths to constrict Western economies, and American rare earth competitors have been supported by industrial policy in response. After all, without rare earths the production of a laundry list of technologies — EVs, data centers, drones, wind turbines, smartphones, robots, and more — grinds to a halt.
The US has been attempting to support an ex-China rare earth industry for the past decade, and government support is necessary for any ex-China industry to succeed. Projects are low-margin, decade-long investments that require the government to derisk and backstop ventures, such that the barriers to success are low enough that private investment takes the industry seriously. The second Trump administration has made a flurry of deals, replete with debt financing and equity purchases from the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) and the Department of War’s Office of Strategic Capital (OSC), ostensibly for the purpose of securing America’s critical mineral supply chains.
But many deals have raised eyebrows in the current and incoming Congress, especially deals involving companies with ties to President Trump’s family or his political appointees. In total, the Trump administration has made over a dozen major deals with magnet rare earth operations, with financing packages ranging from just below $100 million to $2.2 billion. Some deals that Congress has targeted include:
USA Rare Earth, a vertically integrated mine-to-magnet company, which received $277 million in federal funding as well as potential access (pending milestones) to a maximum of $1.3 billion in CHIPS loans. In exchange for this financing, the Commerce Department now owns equity in the company. The placement agent for the government deal was Cantor Fitzgerald, a firm formerly run by Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and currently run by his sons.
Vulcan Elements is making NdFeB magnets in North Carolina, and they received a conditional loan commitment of $620 million from OSC and a $50 million equity deal from Commerce. This deal is under suspicion because 1789 Capital, an investment firm where Donald Trump Jr. is a partner, invested in Vulcan a few months before the OSC deal. (Trump Jr.’s individual stake in Vulcan is undisclosed, but it seems unlikely that it is higher than 0.5%.1) The OSC deal was allegedly prioritized by Peter Navarro, a White House adviser and personal friend of Trump Jr.
ReElement, a rare earths refining company, which received a $25 million investment from DoW’s Economic Defense Unit (EDU), is under suspicion due to its status as a supply-chain partner of Vulcan.
Energy Fuels, a uranium producer now transitioning to include rare earths capabilities, received a $725 million conditional loan offer from OSC. Energy Fuels’s leaders are currently under investigation by Democratic members of the House for allegedly conducting insider trading before President Trump’s decision to effectively open more areas for Energy Fuels’ processing of uranium and vanadium.
Other deals may be under scrutiny for their equity exchange terms — a preferred tool that is nearly unprecedented in US government policy. The most salient example of this is the landmark MP Materials deal, where DoW purchased $400 million of MP stock and obtained warrants in exchange for a $150 million loan, a ten-year price floor on MP’s NdPr products, and guaranteed offtake of MP Material’s NdFeB magnets. That deal made the Department of War the largest shareholder of MP Materials, the USA’s only currently-operational rare earths mine.
So, what will Congress do about these deals, and what can we expect to happen to the American rare earths push?
The Looming Investigations
Using congressional investigations to discipline the mining industry is not a hypothetical. Besides the House investigation into Energy Fuels, Democratic Congressmen have begun investigating Vulcan, ReElement, and USA Rare Earths. The MP deal remains untouched for now. When the new Congressmen take their seats, we can expect more subpoenas, scrutiny, and Congressional oversight over all of the seemingly unsavory deals.
It is unclear, however, what Congress can actually do about the situation. Many of the aforementioned deals have already been completed; funding has been dispensed, and equity has already been purchased. It will be extremely difficult for Congress to unwind those deals. Future bargains, however, may be unlikely given that due diligence typically requires a year — during which a new appropriation could override the funding authority.
However, many existing deals, particularly EXIM ones, are conditioned on milestones that haven’t yet been met. Companies are still undergoing review processes, holding only Letters of Interest, or pursuing production/technical thresholds necessary to unlock some or all of the money. For such deals, Congress can attempt to withhold appropriations to defund the already-inked contracts, but this is easier said than done. The funding for OSC has already been appropriated by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, and EXIM’s charter empowers it to make its own deals. Congress would need to pass legislation to cancel those appropriations and alter the EXIM charter if it wanted to truly neuter the administration’s dealmaking capabilities. And then, of course, any legislation would be subject to a presidential veto.
The only feasible route for walking back some deals is congressional investigation that leads to legal battles. For the companies currently undergoing due diligence for their conditional loans, Congress could unearth evidence of fraud or due diligence violations which may then be referred to the DOJ. The legal mechanism here is still not concrete, but the bad optics could lead to OSC or EXIM unilaterally cancelling deals. The atmosphere at OSC must be pretty awkward right now, and Congress has already begun asking for related offices to keep track of all communication relating to certain deals. Once the Democrats assume the majority, they will no longer be asking but subpoenaing.
Is This the End of the Rare Earths Push?
With some deals in jeopardy, does a Blue Congress spell the death of the rare earths agenda? Likely not, but it does portend a new form of rare earths policy. The Trump administration’s rare earth policy predominantly stemmed from authority in the executive branch — namely in the form of EXIM and OSC reaching agreements with individual companies.
The incoming Congress will likely wrest power away from the executive and instead opt for legislative approaches to critical minerals policy. Instead of officials unilaterally negotiating with companies to give out loans or buy equity, Congressional aspirations would ideally manifest as comprehensive legislation that employs market-wide incentives spanning both the supply- and demand-side to achieve rare earths security.
Several bills along these lines have already been proposed in the current Congress, and we can expect more proposals like these to be brought up in the next session. Promising bills include the Magnets Value Chain Support Act, the National Critical Minerals Council Act, the Critical Materials Future Act, the STRATA Act, the Critical Mineral Executive Coordination Act, and so many more. A sign of encouragement is that all of these bills are bipartisan, so we can hope for a whole-country effort behind these policies.
If Congress can succeed with bipartisan legislation, it can also fail by turning the administration’s deals into a witch hunt. Most of the companies involved in deals don’t deserve to be treated as grift projects; they are often real enterprises in an industry with strategic importance yet meager margins. In the past few years, Congress has offered them no support while the administration has provided badly-needed funding. Throwing them out with the bathwater accomplishes nothing. Even if individually “picking winners” was a suboptimal solution, it was better than no solution at all; Congress must pick up from the state of play and build upon it rather than razing what has already been built.
And an incoming legislative approach is absolutely necessary for the US to achieve rare earth security. Rare earth projects require ten to thirty year time frames to begin exploration, develop and pilot technologies, and then finally scale. Unless investors and companies know that the government is prioritizing these projects for the long haul, the investments will never start to flow, and the projects will never get off the ground.
While the President’s deals were perhaps not to the Democrats’ satisfaction, they spurred the industry to begin moving its wheels. Now, to make sure they keep moving and to attract even more capital, legislation is required to cement incentives regardless of what Party is in control. Whether they be demand-side incentives like the Magnets Value Chain Support Act, tariffs on Chinese magnets, supply-side incentives for firms producing in the US, or whatever else, we need something that lasts. The worst mistake that Congress could make would be cracking down on yesterday’s deals today, while failing to pass anything tomorrow.
