Hi Nick, I'd be very interested in your view on how Xi's planned visit to the U. S. in September might affect the rare-earth sector. Do you see a risk that Trump could use rhetoric about Xi's visit, China policy, or rare-earth supply chains to generate volatility in critical-minerals stocks-creating opportunities for allies, insiders, or related business interests to profit? Could you write an article about this topic? Thank you.
The contingent-versus-demonstrated cooperation distinction is doing more theoretical work than it first appears — it's essentially explaining why COCOM-style coalitions historically unravel (contingent cooperation collapses the moment one side suspects defection) while something like this synthesis screening proposal might actually hold (each side has independent reason to act, cooperation is a byproduct rather than the precondition). The commenter's skepticism about political baggage is fair, but it may be answering the wrong question — the framework isn't betting on US-China trust existing, it's betting that trust isn't actually required if both sides have selfish reasons to act anyway. That's a genuinely different theory of how rival powers cooperate than most historical arms-control frameworks assumed.
It's odd that you don't mention the huge elephant in the room: there is no basis for US-Chinese bilateral trust on either biorisk or AI. It is blindingly obvious to non-experts that there is way too much political baggage associated with COVID-19 for this to work. I mean, it's not a bad idea, and the ideas discussed here are worth trying, but isn't it obvious that this whole initiative is going to run into a giant buzzsaw when it hits the world of electoral politics?
Hi Nick, I'd be very interested in your view on how Xi's planned visit to the U. S. in September might affect the rare-earth sector. Do you see a risk that Trump could use rhetoric about Xi's visit, China policy, or rare-earth supply chains to generate volatility in critical-minerals stocks-creating opportunities for allies, insiders, or related business interests to profit? Could you write an article about this topic? Thank you.
US–China biorisk cooperation sounding possible is the least boring headline in a while.
https://paretoinvestor.substack.com/p/south-of-the-consensus
The contingent-versus-demonstrated cooperation distinction is doing more theoretical work than it first appears — it's essentially explaining why COCOM-style coalitions historically unravel (contingent cooperation collapses the moment one side suspects defection) while something like this synthesis screening proposal might actually hold (each side has independent reason to act, cooperation is a byproduct rather than the precondition). The commenter's skepticism about political baggage is fair, but it may be answering the wrong question — the framework isn't betting on US-China trust existing, it's betting that trust isn't actually required if both sides have selfish reasons to act anyway. That's a genuinely different theory of how rival powers cooperate than most historical arms-control frameworks assumed.
It's odd that you don't mention the huge elephant in the room: there is no basis for US-Chinese bilateral trust on either biorisk or AI. It is blindingly obvious to non-experts that there is way too much political baggage associated with COVID-19 for this to work. I mean, it's not a bad idea, and the ideas discussed here are worth trying, but isn't it obvious that this whole initiative is going to run into a giant buzzsaw when it hits the world of electoral politics?