The “Potemkin Pacific” may be less a military problem than a systems problem.
A country can have carriers, aircraft, missiles, autonomous systems and enormous defence budgets on paper, while the underlying system that sustains them becomes increasingly fragile.
The discussion around shipbuilding captures this. Buying platforms is visible and politically attractive. Paying for maintenance, crews, logistics, spare parts, supply chains, training and readiness is less visible. Yet it is the latter that converts hardware into actual capability. The warning that a large investment today can create a hollow force a few years later is therefore bigger than a budgeting problem.
The most interesting part for me was the argument that AI may not need its own separate “force” at all. If the technology is going to reshape everything from command and control to autonomous systems, perhaps the bigger challenge is changing the institutions around it rather than simply creating another specialised unit.
That’s gold, Jerry! Gold! Wish I could have joined you for this one.
Gems all quads.
I’ll pick just one: “How we construct the military and how we promote people matters more than creating a separate force or some other body in government to be the deep thinker.”
Have you guys seen The Wargame? British TV show where they have taken high ranking politicians, ex-intelligence and military officials, and put them through a televised war game. Follows a podcast by the same name. Curious on views, I found it interesting and plausible as a Brit
Paparo having half the planet on the map and not enough force to match it is the line that stuck. Midterm budget squeeze plus services fighting for themselves is a bad mix if the Pacific is supposed to be the main theater. Worth watching whether the AI-branch talk becomes real force design or just another silo.
The “Potemkin Pacific” may be less a military problem than a systems problem.
A country can have carriers, aircraft, missiles, autonomous systems and enormous defence budgets on paper, while the underlying system that sustains them becomes increasingly fragile.
The discussion around shipbuilding captures this. Buying platforms is visible and politically attractive. Paying for maintenance, crews, logistics, spare parts, supply chains, training and readiness is less visible. Yet it is the latter that converts hardware into actual capability. The warning that a large investment today can create a hollow force a few years later is therefore bigger than a budgeting problem.
The most interesting part for me was the argument that AI may not need its own separate “force” at all. If the technology is going to reshape everything from command and control to autonomous systems, perhaps the bigger challenge is changing the institutions around it rather than simply creating another specialised unit.
That’s gold, Jerry! Gold! Wish I could have joined you for this one.
Gems all quads.
I’ll pick just one: “How we construct the military and how we promote people matters more than creating a separate force or some other body in government to be the deep thinker.”
Have you guys seen The Wargame? British TV show where they have taken high ranking politicians, ex-intelligence and military officials, and put them through a televised war game. Follows a podcast by the same name. Curious on views, I found it interesting and plausible as a Brit
Paparo having half the planet on the map and not enough force to match it is the line that stuck. Midterm budget squeeze plus services fighting for themselves is a bad mix if the Pacific is supposed to be the main theater. Worth watching whether the AI-branch talk becomes real force design or just another silo.