Xi Rumors

+ an epic Bill Bishop rant and Politburo Regulations

Well, we’ve seen this before…

Lily Ottinger reports:

You’ve probably heard the recent rumors that Xi Jinping is facing the threat of imminent replacement by PLA and party elites. As a longtime observer of internal Russian politics, I’ve become desensitized to this type of speculation — rumors about Putin facing serious illness or internal overthrow first surfaced in 2012, then again in 2015, 2016, 2020, 2022, and 2023. How often has Xi gotten similar treatment? As far as I can tell, this is the third sustained instance of replacement rumors over the course of Xi’s 12-year tenure. A rundown:

September 2022: India Pumps ‘Xi Under House Arrest’

In September 2022, Premier Li Keqiang attended the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly in Xi’s place. This absence was followed by a period of about 10 days where Xi didn’t appear in public, which sparked rumors that he was under house arrest and would be replaced by General Li Qiaoming 李桥铭. This coincided with mass changes to commercial flights through China, with more than 9,000 flights being cancelled on September 21st. Rumors of a coup spread quickly across Indian news media in particular, and an Indian politician with more than 10 million followers tweeted about Xi’s supposed house arrest.

Flights returned to normal by the following Monday, and Xi resumed public appearances not long after. Rather than being under house arrest, it seems Xi was observing the zero-covid quarantine requirement after traveling to Uzbekistan for a Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit on September 16th. In December of 2022, Li Qiaoming was promoted to commander of the PLA Ground Force.

August 2024: Xi About to Die?

In August 2024, a Falun Gong-run Chinese media outlet called “Secret China” published a sensational report claiming Xi was gravely ill and that he would step down from his position as General Secretary at the annual Beidaihe leadership retreat, and only retain his position as President of China. The story alleged that party officials had decided to replace Xi with Hu Chunhua 胡春华, citing a cryptic tweet from a princeling. A YouTube video also cited in the report observed that, when Xi had met with the leaders of Vietnam, Italy, and East Timor in July 2024, the placards describing Xi’s position translated to “President of the PRC” instead of “General Secretary” or “Chairman of the Central Military Commission.”

Summer vacation came and went, and Hu Chunhua was not promoted.

May 2025 to Today — Third Time’s Probably not the Charm

This most recent round of rumors began in May, when Xi didn’t appear in public for about two weeks. Like the previous cases, rumors began with commentators in the diaspora — this time it was dissident journalist Cai Shenkun of the Falun Gong-run Epoch Times, citing an open letter detailing 28 of Xi’s policy mistakes and calling for his resignation that was allegedly emailed to Cai in December 2024.

The rumors gained momentum after Li Qiang attended the BRICS summit in Xi’s place on July 6th. Another parallel with previous rumors is that Indian news outlets like the Hindustan Times have been quick to disseminate this speculation for clicks. Yao Cheng, a former lieutenant colonel in the PLA Navy living in exile, alleges that Xi will be forced to retire at the 21st National Congress in October 2027 — so the rumors will probably stick around until then.

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Bill is Right

Bill Bishop

has an excellent riff on the rumors on his latest Sharp China podcast. I (Jordan) couldn’t agree more.

Whatever we talk about here, just remember that when you get into early August and someone writes a story saying Xi has disappeared, it happens every year at this time.

What I will say is, first, we don't know. Chinese elite politics is a black box, so we cannot say with 100% confidence that nothing is going on. That's my initial caveat. However, when you look at the round of rumors and the way I approach them—this is something I've done in my newsletter for a long time.

My master's was in looking at Chinese politics. My master's advisor was at the time one of the US government's top experts on Chinese politics (now retired). I talk to lots of people who spend time focusing on elite Chinese politics. People get things wrong, but I do feel comfortable expressing opinions in this area more than in other areas.

When you see a rumor that Xi is in trouble, there are a few things you should ask. First, what is that being based on? Some of these reports were based on there being no Politburo meeting in May, so therefore Xi is in trouble. Someone says that to you without mentioning that there was also no Politburo meeting announced in May 2023. Actually, during this Party Congress, the number of monthly Politburo meetings that have been missed or not announced is much higher than in previous Party Congresses. If they don't give you that caveat, it tells me they're not actually doing the work of trying to see what is anomalous and what is not.

If someone says Xi Jinping disappeared for 13 days in May and that's a big problem, without saying that he has disappeared for similar periods previously—not around that early August break, but in other parts of the year—it's strange. We don't know why, but it has happened before and then he came back. Again, that's not evidence there is a problem.

Third, if somebody says Xi Jinping looks like he's being mentioned less in People's Daily or state media, that is patently not true. Demonstrably untrue. [See the China Media Project’s coverage on this topic.] Someone who says that is not doing the work. If someone cites a Twitter account or YouTube account, another red flag. That's a problem without understanding their track record of predictions and without checking whether they're linked to Falun Gong accounts. There are dozens of Falun Gong accounts spouting crap about all sorts of things, especially Chinese politics.

For example, there was an op-ed in The Spectator by a professor of Japanese history. The Spectator article, like the New York Post article, got a lot of traction. The guy cited some of the things I talked about without any background, then he cited accounts that were clearly Falun Gong accounts. But people read this—"Oh, it's The Spectator. Oh, it's the New York Post. It must be real." It cycles up and gets amplified.

I understand why a lot of people want to believe it's true. Hopium is a strong drug. The idea that different leadership—this mythical reformer—might come in, like the alleged reformer Wang Yang (poor Wang, he's retired). He's probably not happy that all these rumors about him taking over from Xi keep circulating during his retirement. The idea that Wang Yang is somehow this fantasy that people keep having—that there's just a reformer over there somewhere. As a friend of mine who worked on this stuff for a long time in the government said, "People are always looking for someone to mail the cake to."

I understand why people want to believe this, because the idea that they'll come in and fix the economy, maybe change the approach to Russia, maybe change the approach to trade—it's much easier to hope that's happening than to deal with the reality.

The actuarial tables give Xi a 3% chance of dying or becoming incapacitated this year, and the premium for holding a position for six months on polymarket is around 4%. Even a 2% chance of a coup seems high to me.

For Actual Insight into Xi

Check out our interview with Joseph Torigian on his monumental scholarly achievement: The Party’s Interest Comes First: The Life of Xi Zhongxun, Father of Xi Jinping, easily a contender for one of the best China books of the decade. Joseph’s goal, in his own words, was to “shine as much light into the darkness of the past as possible” to understand the nature of authoritarian politics, and he succeeds beyond my wildest expectations.

This biography gives me a feel for Chinese politics that I honestly thought I’d never have. It does an incredible job of digging deep to shed light on some of the most consequential moments in CCP history, as well as conveying what it was like to live as a senior official under Mao and Deng. Reading it was a powerful experience at both an intellectual and human level.

We get memorable vignettes, like 15-year-old Xi Zhongxun attempting to assassinate a teacher, or General Peng Dehuai using his shoe to silence Xi Zhongxun’s snoring in their shared bunk.

In this interview, we discuss:

• What we can learn about authoritarianism, the CCP, and China’s future from studying Xi’s father,

• Torigian’s methodology for uncovering hidden Party history,

• How the Party became an existential source of meaning, and how it weaponized suffering to paradoxically deepen political loyalty,

• The interplay of family, love, and career under the all-encompassing shadow of the Party,

Listen now on iTunes, Spotify, YouTube, or your favorite podcast app. Transcript here if you prefer!

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‘Containing Xi’, or refining party rule?

What does the latest politburo meeting reveal about Chinese politics?

Dr.

Holly Snape

is Lecturer in Politics at the University of Glasgow. This piece was originally posted by the Council on Geostrategy.

The Investigator | No. 15/2025

New regulations on central decision making bodies

Speculation about the June politburo meeting readout is feeding rumours of Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s ‘weakening’ hold on power. The readout announced that the politburo had reviewed new ‘Regulations on Party Centre Decision Making, Discussion and Coordinating Body Work’ [‘党中央决策议事协调机构工作条例’].

This speculation hangs on two ideas. The wilder of the two is that some elusive group of actors has decided to establish a new body above Xi. This is based on a misreading of the first line of the readout – a boilerplate introduction to the topic at hand, not a declaration of a new power centre being established. The second is that these regulations are designed to rein in Xi’s power by placing it under institutionalised constraint.

Both readings ignore basic facts and two ongoing, well-documented trends: centralised CCP decision making nudging out the state, and ‘rule-based rule of the party’ [‘依规治党’]. Linking the readout to speculation about Xi’s ‘decline’ misses an opportunity to examine the regulations’ significance for the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) evolving political system. While analysis of Xi’s impact on the system rightly points to power ‘centralisation’ and ‘personalisation’, less is known about how the CCP and its leader use power once it has been centralised. The regulations – not yet released – are likely part of the party centre’s ongoing task of modifying institutions to help it put centralised power into action.

To be clear, the politburo meeting readout contains nothing shocking. The party centre has long been planning to formulate the regulations in question. We know this because they were mentioned in April 2023’s Central Intra-Party Regulations Formulation Work Plan Outline (2023-2027) (hereinafter ‘Party Regulations Formulation Outline’).

What is ‘centralised power’ without rules to use it?

These planned regulations are part of Xi’s longstanding pet project to govern the CCP and the PRC by rules – his macro-plan combines ‘rule-based rule of the party’ and ‘law-based rule of the country.’ On coming to power, Xi spoke of the party’s need for rules to rein in the party’s excesses and avoid the existential threat of a breakdown in the party-people relationship, and he has been making rules ever since.

Xi has made rules about making rules – stipulating how party regulations can be formulated and by whom – and has made rules to put his fellow party members’ authority ‘in a cage’ [‘把权力关在笼子里’]. He has used rules to his advantage, giving himself maximum flexibility for pushing through decisions and to remould the party’s internal workings, creating new incentive structures, and making himself the ‘core’ with whom all must ‘align.’ He has used rules for everything; from dictating how many dishes cadres may serve when entertaining to delineating party powers to manipulate the state.

Xi takes rules, and their use for creating governance mechanisms, seriously. He regards them as integral to ‘modernising’ Chinese governance. In 2019, a Central Committee Plenum document resolved to ‘better translate China’s institutional strengths into national governance efficacy.’ The document called for ‘strengthening the role’ of the bodies involved in the controversial politburo readout, improving mechanisms for ensuring party centre decisions are implemented and ‘strictly enforcing’ the instruction requesting and reporting system – a little-discussed system of longstanding importance to the party’s internal workings which is discussed later in this article.

Xi has used rules not only to maximise his concentration of power, but also to facilitate its use. The Central Military Commission ‘Chairman in Charge’ system [‘中央军委主席负责制’] is a case in point. While analysts stress Xi’s being ‘in charge’ – and his ultimate authority to make decisions – his attempt to create a whole set of rules and mechanisms to facilitate this decision-making role go under the radar. For instance, the ‘three mechanisms’ developed through intra-party rules seek to serve the Chairman’s decision making capabilities.

What are Party Centre DDC bodies?

Party Centre Decision Making, Discussion and Coordination bodies (DDC bodies) form a level of authority which shifts major decision making upwards, away from state institutions. Some were originally ‘Leadership Small Groups’ transformed into commissions under the 2018 institutional reform. Their upgrade sought to ‘strengthen the Party Centre’s centralised, unified leadership over major work.’ Others, such as the Central Science and Technology Commission (CSTC), were established directly as commissions.

Though researchers refer to the new regulations as the ‘regulations on the Work of the Party Central Committees [DDC bodies]’, the document’s official title uses ‘Party Centre’ [‘党中央’], not ‘Central Committee’ [‘中央委员会’]. This reflects the nature of Party Centre DDC bodies: they are beholden to the 24 men of the politburo or the seven men of its Standing Committee (PBSC) and not to the larger Central Committee. Xi himself, as General Secretary, has direct control over the topics of DDC body meetings, either deciding on, or giving the go-ahead to, a meeting.

On the functions of Party Centre DDC bodies, the language from the June politburo readout is almost verbatim that of the aforementioned Party Regulations Formulation Outline. The Outline stated that such regulations are needed to help DDC bodies fulfil their functions of: ‘top-level design, choreographing and coordinating, integrated promotion, and monitoring and urging implementation’ [‘顶层设计, 统筹协调, 整体推进, 督促落实’] of major work. This is precisely the language used in the 2020 Central Committee Work Regulations, which stipulate the Central Committee’s power to create DDC bodies. The politburo readout uses the same ‘4x4’ character expression. This language is also used for the specific DDC bodies. The 2023 institutional reform plan describes the then-new Central Finance Commission’s functions in exactly the same way. The PRC Law on Foreign Relations grants the same functions to the Central Foreign Affairs Commission.

The new regulations will complement or adjust existing rules. Said rules themselves reveal something of these elusive power centres’ workings. Xi’s ten-year rule making spree has reinvigorated the Instruction Requesting and Reporting system [‘请示报告制度’] (IRR). The IRR lets lower ranking bodies request instructions from senior organisations and report back up on implementation. It enables party entities to respond to eventualities on the ground in their locality or policy field, although it can also create logjams.

At least since 2019, DDC bodies – and their leaders individually – have been permitted to play the role of IRR responders. This may be a way of delegating party centre authority while helping facilitate calibration of policies with central requirements. It could also help with the apparent spike in IRR requests resulting from a decade of relentless campaigns, pervasive punishments and strict demands for alignment with party centre policy, which has left officials ‘lying flat’ or looking for other ways to avoid culpability. DDC bodies have been ordered to create detailed and specific rules for implementing IRR in their own fields. This could amount to substantive power delegation to the heads of DDC bodies’ implementing offices.

The respective arrangements of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission (CFAC) and the CSTC serve as useful discussion points. Wang Yi, CFAC Office Head, holds triple roles, also serving as a politburo member and Minister of Foreign Affairs. This links CFAC decisions directly to the principal state implementing agency. With Wang heading both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the CFAC Office, he can implement CFAC decisions through both the MFA and through coordinated action with other CFAC member ministries. Wang’s position as CFAC Office Head may be an authoritative lever to press other agencies to coordinate with the MFA. While the CFAC-MFA setup may be an outlier (due to the demise of Qin Gang, Wang’s predecessor), the CSTC’s arrangements are similar. Yin Hejun, Minister of Science and Technology (and Central Committee member), reportedly doubles up as CSTC Office Head, allowing CSTC decisions to flow directly to the Ministry of Science and Technology and giving Yin the lever of CSTC Office Head to help coordinate the implementation of CSTC decisions.

Xi ‘in decline’ or delegated powers being refined?

Returning to the politburo meeting readout, considering the powerful role of DDC Office Heads it is unsurprising that regulations should require DDC bodies to ‘coordinate, not stand in for, and perform as required, not overstep’ [‘统筹不代替、到位不越位’]. While speculation sees this as a ‘direct criticism of Xi’, it is more likely that the relevant provision seeks to regulate the power delegated by the Party Centre. Notably, Xi has himself used the expression in relation to the Central Comprehensive Law-based-rule Commission.

Overlooking subnational practice misses a chance to reflect on assumptions. Countering the notion that, from the politburo readout, ‘some language could reasonably be read as Xi being shunted aside’, provincial-level party committees are repeating that very same language in a promise to do better. Shanxi, Chongqing and Xinjiang, for example, declared that they will ‘study the spirit’ of Xi’s ‘important [politburo meeting] speech’ and improve the practices of their subnational DDC bodies. They will produce ‘realistic and effective policy measures’ [‘切合实际、行之有效的政策举措’] – a line also in the politburo meeting readout – and better regulate DDC body establishment and operation under their jurisdiction to ‘ensure implementation of Party Centre decisions.’ Provincial-level party committees have the power to make intra-party regulations. It appears communications about the Party Centre Regulations are prompting them to follow suit and make implementing documents to tighten up on local DDC body practice.

The regulations are likely less a signal of Xi’s waning star and more a run-of-the-mill move to hammer out the details of how the CCP uses the power it has centralised under Xi’s first two and a half terms. It may be that the Party Centre (or members thereof) will attempt to have the regulations’ content incorporated into the Party Charter at the 21st National Party Congress in 2027. This would give the CCP ‘constitutional’ credibility to the use of DDC bodies in governance, consolidating their place in the New Era Party bureaucracy.