This is not good: "Currently, China isn’t even a top priority for most American strategic thinkers." Combine that with recent reporting of what's happening at the NSC, and things don't look so great at the moment.
While only one of many examples, you can use AI as illustrative of some of the broader challenges the U.S. is facing with matching China's ability to scale while increasing productivity growth rates. AGI and ASI are wonderful research topics, but at this point we need -- as Rush and Jeff Ding continue to underscore -- faster diffusion and putting the technology to work in ways that optimize scaled manufacturing & leading-edge software integration. Both of which are and should remain American strengths.
I'm more pessimistic about "allied scale" than Rush and Kurt seem to be, at least for the time being. Breaking trust with allies & partners and treating them as targets for coercive strategies rather than as equals, is hardly conducive to long-term success. Humility is in short supply right now. Rush's diagnosis and prescription are excellent; the ability to execute them remains highly suspect. ("Instead, we have a unilateral, diminished American position with the entire world angry at us. I don’t believe that was the optimal approach." That's the biggest understatement of the conversation!)
I've seen few books on China's strategy with such deep primary sourcing as The Long Game. Remarkable reading. Can't wait to see what comes out of the Georgetown/CFR initiative.
The conclusion I’m increasingly resolving on is “China is cooked, the US is cooked for different reasons, and the competition is to see who crashes out first.”
A very insightful article which highlights the importance of levering the advantage of "allied scale". Writing as an Australian, from a country which is a "rusted on" ally of the US, I must say that the majority here is utterly horrified at what is happening in the US. We have lost all trust that the US is a reliable ally. When we see Zelensky treated with derision and both citizens and non-citizens rounded up and deported to hell camps in El Savaldor, when we see the ineffectual response of Congress, and the weakness of the US Supreme Court in the face of a President who is rapidly turning into a tyrant, we feel a sense of outrage, horror and extreme disappointment. TRUST is essential to an allied effort. The US has lost the trust of its allies. Consider the words of Claude Malhuret, French senator, on 4 March: "Washington has become the court of Nero, a fiery emperor, submissive courtiers, and a ketamine-fueled jester in charge of purging the civil service..Trump's message is that there is no point in being his ally since he will not defend you..."
Doshi: “We’re discussing the quality of life Americans enjoy, which stems from constituting just 5% of the world’s population yet achieving extraordinary wealth — a reality made possible by a system designed to sustain this quality of life.” So (a cynic might ask) is that what it all comes down to? Ensuring the sustainability of an environmentally unsustainable “system” which, drawing on the historical legacies of the British, Japanese, American and other empires and supported by post-WWII systems of neocolonial & neoliberal repression & exploitation, has made it possible for 5% of the world’s population to consume 25% of the world’s resources, including 18% of the world’s primary energy while producing 30% of the world’s waste, all under internal conditions which ensure that the top 0.1% control nearly 14% of the wealth—and are actively rigging the system to increase their share? Isn’t that kind of a hard sell?
Every diatribe about disproportionate resource consumption ever written employs circular logic. Resource provision follows technological capacity and consumer demand. There is literally no such thing as a country that “consumes 25% of the world’s resources,” because the denominator is not remotely fixed.
Energy is sufficiently cheap that processing and reprocessing of materials is a simple matter compared to any period of history earlier than 50 years ago. So long as we continue to progress towards making energy consumption sustainable we will be completely fine even as other societies grow to have American per capita demands for goods and services.
No one who is genuinely from a poor society buys this bullshit about the US consuming too much, they simply want to make it so their societies have the capacity and demand to do the same, which is the most difficult task in human history.
Not sure such a broad rejection of the claim is justifiable. Consider the resource of labor, for one thing. % of labor product does not have an infinite denominator. There are poor resource-exporting societies in which people are coerced by broadly neocolonial monopoly/monopsony arrangements into trading their labor for subsistence - while a small elite transfers the wealth to themselves. In the modern day storing wealth in offshore accounts in the US - thereby leading to more consumption where their wealth is stored and less where it is generated. This was the future England wanted for its colonies - notably including the North American ones which later became the US. The upstream comment asks a fundamental question of "distributional justice", phrasing it as sustainability. It is no less valid today than 100 years ago. By breaking a number of techno-commercial G7 monopolies, "global south" powers upend this transfer of wealth - potentially restoring distribution among nations. Such an outcome has uncomfortable side effects on power balance of course.
This shares the precise flaw as the above! Does anyone think that if the DRC were a middle-income, moderately industrialized power the extraction of cobalt wouldn’t be many times less exploitative, while also being much larger in volume? To believe this flies in the face of all human history!
The DRC is poor because its institutions suck, and I don’t think that we need to shy away from neo-colonialism’s role in why to believe that the modern economy could still exist if it and many places were producing minerals at an industrial scale because they’re wealthier and more technologically capable.
I’m honestly not even sure how to respond to the starry-eyed notion that the “Global South” has broken a developed world monopoly on the sinews of modernity.
First, China couldn’t possibly care less about the Global South, even to the meager extent that the US did in facilitating Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and ultimately China to join the ranks of advanced powers by allowing market access and private intellectual property and knowledge transfer. Second, as I said, the G7 specifically built a global trading system which allowed and encouraged this to happen!
Caring not necessary. Only ending the monopoly - which has in fact happened in many categories of goods already. Makes goods available at lower cost therefore more broadly accessible. Econ 101.
Yes when it comes to manufacturing, everybody would like to be China - including the US as we can see in this series of articles. The dynamic I was pointing out, however, is the way in which the G7's former monopoly on technological goods was an integral part of the neocolonial power dynamic - and that is IMHO very relevant to claims that distributional inequities ought not be objected to.
The act of removing a western backed resource-extraction regime of the type I described was never the most difficult part. We see exploitative governments knocked down again and again. (currently West Africa eg). The trick is the consequent economic punishment by the former owners of their capital - justified or not, simply a recurring pattern of events.
With geopolitical competition in earnest now, and a credible alternative to the G7 (and superior efficiency even) for transport, telecom, energy, ports, ships, cars, computers, weapons, IOW everything ... the "game changes" as they say on ESPN. That was my point. Does the game still change even if Beijing looks down their nose at the population of a third world country (as if the former owners of capital did not do this to an extreme)? It sure is still the case. There was a lesser version of this when the US and USSR were competing on the world stage. Now there is a vastly more credible alternative - and one which embraces competitive capitalism, no less.
Wanted to get back to this for a moment, because there's a subtext to "scale" that needs to be addressed here.
Under mixed-market systems, the scale of almost any sector's business operations is downstream from the scale of consumer demand.
China has thus far avoided this axiom by treating GDP growth numbers and consumption as input values and investment as an output, rather than investment and consumption as an input and growth as an output, as in market systems. Were it not for the GDP growth targets and the credit and public investment used to hit them, consumer demand would otherwise be a quite hard constraint on its industrial expansion.
Instead, by rapidly expanding credit relative to the size of the economy and facilitating exports to sop up a lot of consumer demand for final goods, China has allowed private and state enterprises to grow rapidly, consuming a huge fraction of its output in the form of further capital formation and another large fraction in the form of heavily-subsidized exports to foreign consumers.
The last time I took a stab at the numbers, the combination of capital formation (public and private) and net exports of manufactured goods accounts for 60-70% of China's industrial output.
This is not sustainable in the long run at all, and is sustainable in the short-run only when foreign trading partners are willing to provide a demand sop and the government to continually expand credit and slacken the terms on which it's offered.
To a very great extent, the developed world (and the upper-middle-income world) has been fine with "lending" scale to Chinese manufacturing growth at the expense of manufacturing at home, because the heavily-subsidized outputs were cheap to end consumers. That era seems to be coming to an end, globally, regardless of the US's current blunderbuss tactics. What it means for Chinese scale is hard to say.
Best-case, it's a constraint on growth as the Party-State works to slowly reorient the machinery of state to transfer income to the citizenry and provide a social safety net that facilitates consumption, instead of transferring income to industry at the expense of the masses, which increases end-consumption at home, improves quality of life, enables and subsidizes child-rearing, and durably lessens tensions with trade partners.
Worst-case, they continue to run the current playbook until there's a debt overhang they cannot get out in front of, trading partners in both the developed and developing world are fed up with the impact on domestic employment, and the demographic trends are irretrievable. That might actually result in an outright deflationary crisis that would see output fall immensely.
From an American perspective, while Trump is an absolute moron, the idea that unilateral openness to heavily subsidized Chinese exports is an unalloyed good for America and Americans is not justifiable, and that same holds true for our (ex-?) allies and partners abroad. China would have to undergo substantial reforms to its domestic economic paradigm before it could find substantial commonality of interest with locales like the EU, Japan, South Korea, or even Indonesia, India, or Brazil. While the US can absolutely dynamite the current world order, China does not yet have the buy-in to rebuild it along similar lines.
The AUKUS submarine deal is a fascinating choice of alliance template ... there have been some devastating arguments made about its actual cost/benefit balance to Australia.
Thank you Rush and Jordan for hosting. You have achieved the most enviable of objectives - expansive coverage of multile issus and in-depth analysis with excellently depicted data to make your case.
This discussion really highlights the complexity of the US-China dynamic. It's crucial for America to rethink its strategy and leverage its alliances effectively. The stakes are high, and a nuanced approach could make all the difference in maintaining global influence.
Terrific conversation.
This is not good: "Currently, China isn’t even a top priority for most American strategic thinkers." Combine that with recent reporting of what's happening at the NSC, and things don't look so great at the moment.
While only one of many examples, you can use AI as illustrative of some of the broader challenges the U.S. is facing with matching China's ability to scale while increasing productivity growth rates. AGI and ASI are wonderful research topics, but at this point we need -- as Rush and Jeff Ding continue to underscore -- faster diffusion and putting the technology to work in ways that optimize scaled manufacturing & leading-edge software integration. Both of which are and should remain American strengths.
I'm more pessimistic about "allied scale" than Rush and Kurt seem to be, at least for the time being. Breaking trust with allies & partners and treating them as targets for coercive strategies rather than as equals, is hardly conducive to long-term success. Humility is in short supply right now. Rush's diagnosis and prescription are excellent; the ability to execute them remains highly suspect. ("Instead, we have a unilateral, diminished American position with the entire world angry at us. I don’t believe that was the optimal approach." That's the biggest understatement of the conversation!)
I've seen few books on China's strategy with such deep primary sourcing as The Long Game. Remarkable reading. Can't wait to see what comes out of the Georgetown/CFR initiative.
I do agree with you Jack. it's hard to have constructive conversations nowadays but I think we tried our best here!
The conclusion I’m increasingly resolving on is “China is cooked, the US is cooked for different reasons, and the competition is to see who crashes out first.”
A very insightful article which highlights the importance of levering the advantage of "allied scale". Writing as an Australian, from a country which is a "rusted on" ally of the US, I must say that the majority here is utterly horrified at what is happening in the US. We have lost all trust that the US is a reliable ally. When we see Zelensky treated with derision and both citizens and non-citizens rounded up and deported to hell camps in El Savaldor, when we see the ineffectual response of Congress, and the weakness of the US Supreme Court in the face of a President who is rapidly turning into a tyrant, we feel a sense of outrage, horror and extreme disappointment. TRUST is essential to an allied effort. The US has lost the trust of its allies. Consider the words of Claude Malhuret, French senator, on 4 March: "Washington has become the court of Nero, a fiery emperor, submissive courtiers, and a ketamine-fueled jester in charge of purging the civil service..Trump's message is that there is no point in being his ally since he will not defend you..."
Doshi: “We’re discussing the quality of life Americans enjoy, which stems from constituting just 5% of the world’s population yet achieving extraordinary wealth — a reality made possible by a system designed to sustain this quality of life.” So (a cynic might ask) is that what it all comes down to? Ensuring the sustainability of an environmentally unsustainable “system” which, drawing on the historical legacies of the British, Japanese, American and other empires and supported by post-WWII systems of neocolonial & neoliberal repression & exploitation, has made it possible for 5% of the world’s population to consume 25% of the world’s resources, including 18% of the world’s primary energy while producing 30% of the world’s waste, all under internal conditions which ensure that the top 0.1% control nearly 14% of the wealth—and are actively rigging the system to increase their share? Isn’t that kind of a hard sell?
Every diatribe about disproportionate resource consumption ever written employs circular logic. Resource provision follows technological capacity and consumer demand. There is literally no such thing as a country that “consumes 25% of the world’s resources,” because the denominator is not remotely fixed.
Energy is sufficiently cheap that processing and reprocessing of materials is a simple matter compared to any period of history earlier than 50 years ago. So long as we continue to progress towards making energy consumption sustainable we will be completely fine even as other societies grow to have American per capita demands for goods and services.
No one who is genuinely from a poor society buys this bullshit about the US consuming too much, they simply want to make it so their societies have the capacity and demand to do the same, which is the most difficult task in human history.
Not sure such a broad rejection of the claim is justifiable. Consider the resource of labor, for one thing. % of labor product does not have an infinite denominator. There are poor resource-exporting societies in which people are coerced by broadly neocolonial monopoly/monopsony arrangements into trading their labor for subsistence - while a small elite transfers the wealth to themselves. In the modern day storing wealth in offshore accounts in the US - thereby leading to more consumption where their wealth is stored and less where it is generated. This was the future England wanted for its colonies - notably including the North American ones which later became the US. The upstream comment asks a fundamental question of "distributional justice", phrasing it as sustainability. It is no less valid today than 100 years ago. By breaking a number of techno-commercial G7 monopolies, "global south" powers upend this transfer of wealth - potentially restoring distribution among nations. Such an outcome has uncomfortable side effects on power balance of course.
This shares the precise flaw as the above! Does anyone think that if the DRC were a middle-income, moderately industrialized power the extraction of cobalt wouldn’t be many times less exploitative, while also being much larger in volume? To believe this flies in the face of all human history!
The DRC is poor because its institutions suck, and I don’t think that we need to shy away from neo-colonialism’s role in why to believe that the modern economy could still exist if it and many places were producing minerals at an industrial scale because they’re wealthier and more technologically capable.
I’m honestly not even sure how to respond to the starry-eyed notion that the “Global South” has broken a developed world monopoly on the sinews of modernity.
First, China couldn’t possibly care less about the Global South, even to the meager extent that the US did in facilitating Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and ultimately China to join the ranks of advanced powers by allowing market access and private intellectual property and knowledge transfer. Second, as I said, the G7 specifically built a global trading system which allowed and encouraged this to happen!
Caring not necessary. Only ending the monopoly - which has in fact happened in many categories of goods already. Makes goods available at lower cost therefore more broadly accessible. Econ 101.
The global south doesn’t, in the main, want to buy this stuff, it wants to make it!
That’s why they’re so frequently at odds with China on trade topics, all except the poorest and least industrialized countries.
Yes when it comes to manufacturing, everybody would like to be China - including the US as we can see in this series of articles. The dynamic I was pointing out, however, is the way in which the G7's former monopoly on technological goods was an integral part of the neocolonial power dynamic - and that is IMHO very relevant to claims that distributional inequities ought not be objected to.
The act of removing a western backed resource-extraction regime of the type I described was never the most difficult part. We see exploitative governments knocked down again and again. (currently West Africa eg). The trick is the consequent economic punishment by the former owners of their capital - justified or not, simply a recurring pattern of events.
With geopolitical competition in earnest now, and a credible alternative to the G7 (and superior efficiency even) for transport, telecom, energy, ports, ships, cars, computers, weapons, IOW everything ... the "game changes" as they say on ESPN. That was my point. Does the game still change even if Beijing looks down their nose at the population of a third world country (as if the former owners of capital did not do this to an extreme)? It sure is still the case. There was a lesser version of this when the US and USSR were competing on the world stage. Now there is a vastly more credible alternative - and one which embraces competitive capitalism, no less.
Wanted to get back to this for a moment, because there's a subtext to "scale" that needs to be addressed here.
Under mixed-market systems, the scale of almost any sector's business operations is downstream from the scale of consumer demand.
China has thus far avoided this axiom by treating GDP growth numbers and consumption as input values and investment as an output, rather than investment and consumption as an input and growth as an output, as in market systems. Were it not for the GDP growth targets and the credit and public investment used to hit them, consumer demand would otherwise be a quite hard constraint on its industrial expansion.
Instead, by rapidly expanding credit relative to the size of the economy and facilitating exports to sop up a lot of consumer demand for final goods, China has allowed private and state enterprises to grow rapidly, consuming a huge fraction of its output in the form of further capital formation and another large fraction in the form of heavily-subsidized exports to foreign consumers.
The last time I took a stab at the numbers, the combination of capital formation (public and private) and net exports of manufactured goods accounts for 60-70% of China's industrial output.
This is not sustainable in the long run at all, and is sustainable in the short-run only when foreign trading partners are willing to provide a demand sop and the government to continually expand credit and slacken the terms on which it's offered.
To a very great extent, the developed world (and the upper-middle-income world) has been fine with "lending" scale to Chinese manufacturing growth at the expense of manufacturing at home, because the heavily-subsidized outputs were cheap to end consumers. That era seems to be coming to an end, globally, regardless of the US's current blunderbuss tactics. What it means for Chinese scale is hard to say.
Best-case, it's a constraint on growth as the Party-State works to slowly reorient the machinery of state to transfer income to the citizenry and provide a social safety net that facilitates consumption, instead of transferring income to industry at the expense of the masses, which increases end-consumption at home, improves quality of life, enables and subsidizes child-rearing, and durably lessens tensions with trade partners.
Worst-case, they continue to run the current playbook until there's a debt overhang they cannot get out in front of, trading partners in both the developed and developing world are fed up with the impact on domestic employment, and the demographic trends are irretrievable. That might actually result in an outright deflationary crisis that would see output fall immensely.
From an American perspective, while Trump is an absolute moron, the idea that unilateral openness to heavily subsidized Chinese exports is an unalloyed good for America and Americans is not justifiable, and that same holds true for our (ex-?) allies and partners abroad. China would have to undergo substantial reforms to its domestic economic paradigm before it could find substantial commonality of interest with locales like the EU, Japan, South Korea, or even Indonesia, India, or Brazil. While the US can absolutely dynamite the current world order, China does not yet have the buy-in to rebuild it along similar lines.
The AUKUS submarine deal is a fascinating choice of alliance template ... there have been some devastating arguments made about its actual cost/benefit balance to Australia.
I’m currently reading the “Long Game” so this is another great resource into Doshi’s thoughts on relations between the U.S. and China.
Thank you Rush and Jordan for hosting. You have achieved the most enviable of objectives - expansive coverage of multile issus and in-depth analysis with excellently depicted data to make your case.
This lived up to its most important post billing. Fascinating conversation and yes you’ve convinced me to get Doshi’s book!
This discussion really highlights the complexity of the US-China dynamic. It's crucial for America to rethink its strategy and leverage its alliances effectively. The stakes are high, and a nuanced approach could make all the difference in maintaining global influence.
This analysis has enough big holes that all Chinese carriers, built or to be build will pass through with plenty of room to spare.